

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE

ENDC/PV.43
28 May 1962

ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

FEB 15 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 28 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. NASZKOWSKI

(Poland)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Miss M. GOES

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. A. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. R. KRISHNA RAO
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. J. SLAWINSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. T. MANOLIU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. G.A. WESTRING
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.S. HASSAN
Mr. A. EL ERIAN
Mr. G. EL ABD
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK
Mr. J.K. WRIGHT
Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): I declare open the forty-third meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): We are now about to conclude the first reading by the Committee of stage I of the disarmament proposals on the Conference table. There has been much constructive, and some destructive, discussion. All of us here have had contributions to make. The United Kingdom delegation has, in a number of interventions, expressed views on the problems as we see them and on possible means of solving them. We reserve our right to come back, in later phases of our discussions, to the measures to be comprised in stage I.

Meanwhile, before we pass to a first reading of stages II and III, or of the three stages considered as an interconnected whole, there are certain reflections I should like to make on behalf of the United Kingdom. These centre principally around the questions of verification and peacekeeping machinery.

It seemed to me that, as our discussion of stage I developed, it began to emerge more and more clearly that the issue of verification of arms and of force-levels applies in three fields - or, if you like, falls into three parts. First, there is the verification of the destruction of agreed types and numbers of weapons. Secondly, there is verification that the authorized levels of forces and arms permitted in the various stages are not exceeded. Thirdly, there is verification to ascertain whether arms have been concealed in violation of the treaty - whether there are arms hidden "under the jacket". There is a distinction between the second problem, verification of authorized remainders, and the third, whether there are arms hidden "under the jacket". In the case of remainders, some remainders - those up to a certain level - would be authorized by the treaty; but all arms "under the jacket" would, of course, be unauthorized.

A further point which emerged - and this was brought out by speaker after speaker, including the representative of Nigeria - was that the problem of verification becomes more important as the process of disarmament gains momentum. It is not a diminishing problem but an increasing problem, and this for two reasons: first, because the larger the number of arms destroyed, the greater the quantities of weapons destroyed, the more sinister and dangerous will be the significance attaching to any concealed arms; secondly, because the degree of risk of concealment must affect the plans for strengthening the United Nations peace-keeping force until, in the words of the United States draft, "it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no State could challenge it". (ENDC/30, p. 32)

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

I have said that verification of arms and forces applies in three fields: destruction of arms, level of authorized remainders, and hidden armaments. In the first field, that of destruction of arms, there do not seem to be many - if indeed any - divergencies. The Soviet Union says, "Let us gather together into piles the weapons we agree to destroy, and let us make bonfires of them. All such bonfires can be inspected, wherever they take place on Soviet territory". That is what Mr. Zorin says he means, if I understand him rightly, by 100 per cent verification of inspection; and, so far as it goes, I am not aware that any of us disagree. But, as Mr. Burns has pointed out, there is a question of timing, of making sure that the bonfires are simultaneous. That is a point which will clearly have to be considered further in due course.

In the second field, that of verifying that authorized levels of remainders are not exceeded, there does not yet seem to be agreement. The view of my delegation, as we have already said, is that if the treaty imposes an obligation upon signatory States to reduce their force levels and their levels of armaments to particular figures in a particular stage, then verification should be such as to provide assurance that they have honoured that obligation. The first sentence of paragraph 6 of the Agreed Principles reads:

"All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations." (ENDC/5, p. 2)

I understand that the Soviet Government does not accept this view, and considers that the obligation to reduce to an agreed level should form an exception and should not be subject to verification. If that is so, this is a field where further negotiation is required.

As regards the third field, that of hidden weapons, there also remain, unfortunately, wide divergencies. I confess that for my part I do not find the Soviet attitude clear. The representative of the Soviet Union, if I have understood him rightly, does not consider that there should be provisions in the treaty for verification during stages I and II - or, I think, stage III - that there are no arms hidden "under the jacket". He has at one time or another said - or come near to saying - that the Soviet Union would not object in principle in the case of total elimination of a category. At other times he has said, or implied, that such verification is unacceptable to the Soviet Union because it would give opportunities for espionage. At still other

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

times he has said, or implied, that it would be impracticable. He has asked how it would be possible to organize such verification in the 22 million square kilometres of the Soviet Union. Whether he considers it either admissible or possible to organize such verification after the completion of stage III, I do not know. If in his view it would be impracticable or impossible before the end of stage III, it could hardly become practicable or possible after stage III. If, on the other hand, he considers it would be practicable or possible after stage III, but not before, then his objection to it before then cannot be because such verification in itself would be impracticable or impossible, but because it is objectionable to the Soviet Union on other grounds - on grounds of espionage, or whatever it may be.

I am making this analysis, not as a debating point, but because in the view of my delegation it has a long-range importance, for reasons which I will endeavour to explain. Meanwhile, I would only say, as Mr. Godber pointed out in his speech on 18 May, that:

"... the country which proposes the fullest measure of disarmament in stage I - or indeed in other stages - has the responsibility of proposing clearly adequate verification measures to accompany its own particular disarmament proposals."

(ENDC/PV.39, p. 42)

This view was endorsed at the following meeting by the representative of India, who said:

"I think we would all agree that that also sets out a truth which we must bear in mind in formulating the disarmament plan." (ENDC/PV.40, p. 43)

At the same meeting our colleague from the United Arab Republic, speaking on control and verification, pointed out that:

"On their adequacy, effectiveness and strictness depend the amount of confidence generated and the final success of the operation." (ibid., p. 18)

We in the Western delegations believe that Mr. Hassan has here stated a profound truth, and one which none of us around this table can afford to ignore. It is for this reason that the United States has proposed a solution, over and above the inspection of bonfires, to cover the three stages of disarmament until disarmament becomes general and complete. This solution was expressly devised, and is now offered, to meet the fears of espionage so frequently put forward by the Soviet Union. The solution is offered as an answer. There may of course prove to be other, and better, answers to the problems both of remainders and of arms "under the jacket". The solution we

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

offer is that of zonal inspection. It is an attempt to meet the difficulties inherent in the problems both of verification of remainders and of verification of weapons "under the jacket", if the Western proposals are adopted for a 30 per cent cut across the board in the first stage, a corresponding cut in the second stage and complete elimination in the third stage. However, supposing the Western proposals for progressive weapon destruction and for progressive zonal inspection - and the two go along in parallel - are adopted, elimination will add up to 100 per cent at the end of stage III, and so will the right of verification. The Soviet Government has spoken in much the same terms about the end of stage III. It may be, therefore, that at that point in time the curves would meet.

Here I come back to the point I touched upon earlier. To what extent would the right of 100 per cent verification at the end of stage III give 100 per cent guarantee of security, or, to put it in another way, of confidence? Let us not forget the wise words of the representative of Nigeria, who said that disarmament, verification and confidence are three inseparable strands making up a single rope. To make myself as clear as I can, let me say again that the point I am now raising is how far the right of 100 per cent verification at the end of stage III would provide the requisite assurance of control and, therefore, the requisite confidence. In certain fields, we know quite well that it would be easy and far from burdensome to have a system of verification that would provide, at least for us, in our eyes, the necessary assurance. For example, in the field of nuclear testing, 400 foreign scientific technicians, many of them neutral, looking after earthquake recording instruments at about twenty places in quiet areas in the Soviet Union would be quite enough for detection; and about 120 foreign scientists, most of them neutrals, making short visits to small areas indicated by instruments out of the 22 million square kilometres of the Soviet Union, would suffice for inspection. That would be nothing burdensome or complicated, at least in our view. But, when one comes to other fields such as that of hidden weapons or production plants or factories illicitly producing weapons, the picture changes.

I do not know what studies are being conducted in this field by the Soviet Union or whether it is undertaking some practice exercises. However, I am inclined to think that it may be - and I am very glad, if so - from reading a statement which was given out by the Tass Agency on 24 May to the effect that an underground ammunition store dating back to the time of Peter the Great had been found in Ust Kamenogorsk in

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

Kazakhstan. That, I hope, shows that the Soviet Union is in fact taking this problem seriously, as we are. Perhaps it also shows that the problem is not a wholly easy one to solve.

At any rate we in the United Kingdom have made studies in this field, and the results are fairly formidable. Some of the results are formidable indeed. We do not like this conclusion. We wish it were otherwise, but we cannot escape reality by trying to dodge unpalatable facts. Perhaps we are wrong. We should be delighted to be proved wrong. It is because we would like our conclusions to be checked that we welcome and support the suggestion of the representative of Brazil for a working party on verification: on verification of weapon destruction, on verification of retained force levels, on verification to find out whether arms have been concealed in violation of the treaty.

Speaking for my delegation, we are at a loss to understand why the Soviet Government should oppose the formation of such a working party, unless it might have something to fear from its conclusions, something which might invalidate the measures, and perhaps the principles governing them, contained in stage III of the Soviet plan. However that may be, my own plea, that of the United Kingdom, is to let the light of science in. We shall then be able to see more clearly. To be afraid of science is surely to be out of touch with the modern world. In a matter as serious as this, perhaps the most serious problem that mankind has ever been called upon collectively to solve, it is not good enough to refuse to discuss the technical facts which must underpin the structure of our deliberations. Some of these facts may not prove to be to our liking, but surely it is important that they should be widely known and their implications understood.

In what direction do considerations such as these lead us, apart from the need scientifically to study the problem itself? It seems to me that they lead us to realise how closely we must link verification with peace-keeping machinery. It seems to me that, as has indeed been recognized by the Agreed Principles, disarmament must be "accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/5, page 1). I am using the words of the first of the Agreed Principles, in which the two processes are not merely juxtaposed, not merely placed side by side, but organically linked. We must, in fact,

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

invoke strengthened peace-keeping machinery to solve the dilemma otherwise created by disarmament and control. If there were adequate peace-keeping machinery and an adequate peace-keeping force, there would be little, or at least less, incentive for the hidden retention of arms, for hiding arms "under the jacket", and this would surely ease the problem of control. If, on the contrary, there were no adequate peace-keeping machinery and no adequate peace-keeping force, there would be a strong incentive to the ambitious, to the unscrupulous, or to the bad neighbour to hide arms for selfish or aggressive purposes. In that case the control problem becomes immeasurably more difficult.

We can find analogies for this throughout our ordinary life. There are civilian police, but the fact of their existence means that private citizens do not carry revolvers and do not feel it necessary to search the house of their neighbours; the fire brigade exists, and consequently it is not necessary to exercise control over every house by ensuring that it is built exclusively of fireproof materials, and so on. In our view, strengthened peace-keeping machinery is the essential third leg of the stool.

But here again there remain, most unfortunately, differences between the two sides. Our Soviet partners in the negotiations have already expressed strong reserves on verification of remainders and verification of hidden arms. They are equally expressing strong reserves about the idea of strengthening international peace-keeping machinery or providing for either an effective United Nations peace force or even a United Nations observer corps, as proposed in the United States plan.

What would be the purpose of the observer corps? It would be to give confidence that disputes, political or territorial, are nipped in the bud. What would be the object of the United Nations peace force? It would be to give confidence that if any nation had arms hidden "under the jacket" or were tempted to disregard its obligations, United Nations action would be swift and effective. What would be the purpose of strengthening means for the peaceful settlement of disputes, including the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction by the International Court? The purpose would be to give confidence that adequate and reliable means other than the use of arms exist for the settlement of differences.

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

It is not clear to us why the Soviet Union should display such strong aversion to some or all of these suggestions. Mr. Zorin has even opposed them on surprising grounds. He said at our twenty-sixth meeting:

"... the United States is actually trying to circumvent the United Nations..."

(ENDC/PV.26, p. 30)

On the following day, at our twenty-seventh meeting, he made a similar remark in respect of the observation corps (ENDC/PV.27, p. 35). But since both these bodies would be United Nations bodies, his argument is hard to follow. If you strengthen the United Nations, how can you be said to weaken it? If you put more responsibilities on it, how can you be said to side-step it? If the argument of the Soviet Union is that present peace-keeping machinery and present machinery for the settlement of international disputes are adequate, then how is it possible also to argue, as they do, that international tension is acute and the international situation dangerous? If there is so much tension and danger, then surely we ought not to be content with things as they are; surely we ought to see whether we cannot strengthen our methods of dealing with tension, dealing with danger. If, on the other hand, everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds, if we have no tension to worry about, if we have no dangers to fear, then there is no need for negotiations such as those taking place here. But that is not the attitude of the Soviet Union, and indeed to take such an attitude would be to express a contentment with the existing and established order of things which would perhaps hardly be consistent with its general outlook.

What in fact is Mr. Zorin saying to us? He is saying that the position is dangerous, that radical measures must be adopted, that we must be bold, that we must take risks; yet in the same breath he tells us that to accept verification of remainders and of hidden arms during the process of disarmament would be too bold a step, too great a risk for the Soviet Union to take. He tells us that to strengthen the United Nations and peace-keeping machinery after disarmament would be too bold and too risky.

I have dwelt on these matters not in order to complicate our negotiations, and not to prolong unnecessarily our discussion of stage I at this point. My purpose is the contrary: it is merely to point out that if we are to reach the agreement we hope for, there are certain contradictions and certain divergencies which will have to be ironed out when we come in due course to a second, and no doubt to a third, reading of whatever treaty emerges from our discussions.

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

What I am making is a plea that we should realize that there are three legs to the stool - disarmament, verification and strengthened peace-keeping machinery. The stool cannot rest on one leg or on two legs only, it must rest on all three. It is a plea that if we are to reach our common goal on general and complete disarmament we cannot afford to accept a succession of "No's", a succession of "Niets", when it comes to taking the confidence-building measures involved in verification and in a strengthening of peace-keeping machinery. I wonder how many of us in this room would be happily married if we had been content to take "No" for an answer.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I had hoped that we would have completed last week our discussion of stage I of the United States draft treaty outline, but because of the two meetings of the Committee of the Whole that was not possible. I therefore propose this morning to present a perspective of our outline of stage II, but I still have several statements to make with respect to stage I and I want to answer this week the very penetrating questions that were asked by the representative of the United Arab Republic.

In my summary of the proposals for stage II contained in the United States treaty outline, I propose to compare these proposals with stage II of the Soviet draft treaty.

The theme of stage II of the United States treaty outline, like that of stage I, is major, balanced, across-the-board reductions in armed forces and armaments, with proportional increases in verification and in measures for keeping the peace. In the case of armed forces and most armaments in stage II, we propose a 50 per cent cut in the levels remaining at the end of stage I. As members know, the United States treaty outline proposes in stage I a 30 per cent across-the-board cut. This contrasts with the central theme of stage II in the Soviet draft treaty, which, as the representative of the Soviet Union described it at the fortieth meeting, is the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.40, p. 23).

As in the first stage, where the Soviet draft emphasizes the complete elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, that draft concentrates in the second stage on one type of armament, in this case nuclear weapons. As members know, the Soviet draft treaty provides nothing for nuclear weapons until stage II. This is in contrast with the measures provided for in stage I of the United States treaty outline to reduce the nuclear threat. In stage II the Soviet draft treaty provides for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

As in the case of the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in stage I of the Soviet draft treaty, this radical measure, to be accomplished in the short space of fifteen months, would alter the relative military strength of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty Powers, would cause serious imbalance in the existing military mix, and would also perhaps increase the risk of conventional war. As in the case of the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in stage I, the Soviet draft relating to the 100 per cent elimination of weapons in stage II gives no assurance that inspection provided by that draft treaty would be comparable to the amount of destruction. If there is to be 100 per cent destruction, then it would seem to us there must be 100 per cent inspection and verification; but we are given no assurance whatsoever in the Soviet draft that the Soviet Union would open all of its territory to allow a search for hidden stocks of nuclear weapons - just as we have no such assurance with respect to the destruction of nuclear weapon vehicles.

If we were to adopt progressive zonal inspection, the system suggested by the United States as an example of a method by which verification for hidden weapons and hidden activities could proceed step by step with the actual disarmament achieved, it probably would not cover by the end of stage II more than half of the zones in the Soviet Union which were not open to inspection in stage I.

Even if the Soviet Union were to accept progressive zonal inspection and if, further, we were to eliminate all of our nuclear weapons in stage II at a time when much of the territory of other States would be closed to zonal verification and when the resulting mix of forces on the two sides would be more unbalanced than it is in comparison to the mix today, our security would not at all be ensured, and the ensurance of our security is, as members know, a specific requirement of point 5 of the Agreed Principles.

For similar reasons, the solution of the problem of imbalance cannot be found by eliminating all nuclear weapons in the first stage, for this would only make matters worse. I submit that the solution to this imbalance will be found not in the excessive destruction of particular types of weapons in any particular stage, but in the balanced across-the-board step-by-step method appearing in the United States treaty outline.

I have described the theme of stage II of the United States treaty outline and the general rule of a 50 per cent cut of remaining levels for stage II. I would like now to indicate briefly how these would be applied to specific armaments.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I am sure members recall the fairly precise definitions of categories and types of major armaments, particularly nuclear delivery vehicles, in stage I of the United States treaty outline (ENDC/30, paragraph A.1.B, pp. 4, 5). These would be reduced during stage II by 50 per cent of the level remaining at the end of stage I (*ibid.*, paragraph A.1.a, p. 20), leaving only 35 per cent of the stage I inventories on hand to be eliminated during stage III.

In addition, new categories of lesser armaments which had not been reduced during stage I would be reduced in stage II by one-half (*ibid.*, paragraphs A.2.a and B, pp. 20, 21). These lesser armaments would include, for example, armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of up to 2,500 kilogrammes, short range - less than 10 kilometres - missiles, unarmed military aircraft, unarmoured transport vehicles, non-combatant naval vessels, and small arms. I call attention to the fact that no similar provision appears in stage II of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2, p. 16). As in stage I, the Soviet draft would destroy or convert to peaceful uses unspecified - I repeat, unspecified - conventional armaments released by the disbanding of armed forces. I call attention to page 16, article 24, paragraph 2 of that draft. As I pointed out at the thirty-third plenary meeting, (ENDC/PV.33, p. 34), it seems to me, at least, that there is considerable imprecision in the Soviet draft treaty, and that there is nothing in that draft requiring that troops possessing the most modern weapons or tanks be disbanded initially, and nothing prohibiting the transfer of weapons from troops to be disbanded to those which are not to be disbanded before the actual disbanding takes place. We believe that the conventional weapons to be destroyed in stage II should be most carefully agreed upon and specified, as our draft contemplates, so that there can be no misunderstanding.

As has been pointed out before, the United States and the Soviet proposals for armed force levels to be retained at the end of stage II are almost identical: 1,050,000 in the United States draft, paragraph B.1.a(1) of stage II (ENDC/30, p. 22), and 1 million in the Soviet draft, article 24(1) (ENDC/2, p. 16). That is a difference of 50,000 men. In commenting on this similarity, the representative of the Soviet Union said at our fortieth meeting:

"The fact that the United States has put forward a similar figure shows yet again how carefully the Soviet Union has considered all the relevant factors in the preparation of its proposals." (ENDC/PV.40, p. 29)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

To the limited extent of the comparison of our two force levels in stage II, I agree with Mr. Zorin. In fact, I hope that he will judge the merit of his other proposals on the basis of the extent to which they correspond to our proposals. If he does so, the prospect is good for the achievement of a far greater measure of agreement on general and complete disarmament.

At the beginning of stage II the United States also proposes to halt the production of all armaments reduced, except for production of parts for the maintenance of the armaments to be retained. I refer to paragraph A.4.a of stage II, of our draft treaty (ENDC/30, p. 21). In addition, the United States would halt development and testing of new types of armaments: paragraph A.4.c of stage II (ENDC/30, p. 21).

I call attention to the fact that these measures go far beyond the Soviet proposals for conventional armaments. The Soviet draft - which, as I have said earlier, I find quite imprecise as far as treaty language is concerned - would simply reduce production in proportion to the reduction of armed forces, and it would not stop development and testing of new weapons which were not nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological, and were not delivery vehicles for such weapons. I refer to article 25(1) (ENDC/2, p. 17). Both the United States draft treaty and the Soviet draft, however, do contain somewhat comparable restrictions upon the production of ammunition for retained conventional armaments; both would reduce this production to levels consistent with the reduction of armed forces and armaments. I refer to paragraph A.4 of stage II of the United States draft (ENDC/30, p. 21), and to article 25 of the Soviet draft (ENDC/2, p. 17).

The United States outline also proposes the dismantling or the conversion to peaceful use in stage II of agreed military bases, wherever they may be located, whether they are foreign or whether they are domestic. I refer to article D of stage II (ENDC/30, pp. 24, 25).

As we all know, the Soviet draft deals with all foreign bases in stage I. But the Soviet draft contains no proposal whatsoever for the reduction or the elimination of other kinds of bases, either in stage I or in stage II, despite the enormous contiguous land mass in Europe and Asia under Soviet control. It may be that this is to be accomplished under the Soviet draft in stage III with the abolition of military organizations and institutions, but I submit that the provision is too vague and imprecise for a treaty. I refer to article 33 (ENDC/2, p. 21).

(Mr. Dean, United States)

We see no reason whatsoever to wait until stage III before eliminating the first military base, whether in the United States or in the Soviet Union. This lack of continuity in the Soviet draft plan leaves much to be desired and will have to be remedied.

The failure of the Soviet plan to deal with domestic military bases or domestic military bases of its allies, whether in countries of the Warsaw Pact or in Communist China, its failure to stop production of conventional armaments, its failure to halt the testing and development of new conventional weapons, and its failure to make detailed provisions for specific reductions of existing conventional weapons stocks, at a time when it has already provided for the elimination of all nuclear weapons and all military nuclear delivery vehicles, is, I submit, rather striking and should be carefully noted. I would like to ask our Soviet colleague whether he really believes that this would retain at the end of stage II the present relative military balance between the major Powers.

The representative of the Soviet Union criticized our military base proposal for lack of a specified verification measure (ENDC/PV.41, p. 34). We recognize that the exact verification procedures remain to be worked out. This is actually the case with most verification arrangements. However, I would point out that the Soviet draft is similarly lacking in specificity, and indeed it does not even recognize the need for much greater detail.

I quote the pertinent language from the Soviet draft:

"Inspectors of the international disarmament organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to ..." (ENDC/2, para. 3, p. 8).

now quote the pertinent language from the United States draft:

"a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measures and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

"b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures." (ENLC/30, pp. 24, 25)

I do not contend that our existing language in its present form is more specific, but we do provide for its being made more specific in the annex. I just do not see how our Soviet colleague can take much comfort in the lack of specificity in the Soviet language.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I have already contrasted the balanced United States approach toward the agreed objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons with the somewhat more radical approach in the Soviet draft, at a later stage. In the first stage the Soviet draft does nothing to reduce nuclear weapons or the materials for their manufacture. It waits until the second stage to eliminate the weapons. In contrast, the United States draft would begin attacking the problem in the very first stage and would continue by balanced steps in successive stages. In stage I we propose halting the production of fissionable material. We would also transfer a very large quantity of this material - 50,000 kilogrammes or more, if we can agree upon the quantity with the Soviet Union - to peaceful uses.

Finally, in stage I we would:

"... examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles." (ENDC/30, p. 10)

I indicated last Friday our willingness to begin this study before stage I. I should like to repeat that the United States is prepared to participate in an expert study of this problem at an agreed date when necessary preparations for such a study can be completed.

We agree that the provisions concerning nuclear stockpiles should be as explicit as possible. For this reason, we believe that a technical assessment of the situation will be required before a treaty is signed. If the Soviet Union wishes to deal promptly with the threat of nuclear weapons, I submit that such a study is as much in its own interest as it is in the interests of the other parties concerned.

In stage II the United States outline contains the following specific measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the means for their manufacture in the light of the expert study:

1. Declarations covering all fissionable material would be submitted to the international disarmament organization.

Our Soviet colleague said at our forty-first meeting that the Soviet draft called on parties early in stage II for "information about their existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons" (ENDC/PV, 41, p. 43), and that the United States outline called for declarations concerning fissionable material only, not weapons. However, the United States proposal is for information on the amounts, types and nature of utilization of all - I repeat, all - fissionable materials, including materials in nuclear weapons. Fissionable material is, after all, the nuclear explosive of such weapons.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

2. An agreed percentage of the declared fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons would be transferred to peaceful uses. This would take the nuclear explosive out of the nuclear weapons affected.

3. The non-nuclear components of such weapons would then be destroyed.

4. Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissionable materials would be limited.

5. The nuclear weapons remaining six months before the end of stage II would be registered with the international disarmament organization.

As is apparent, under our draft this would leave some nuclear weapons at the end of stage II, just as it would leave some nuclear delivery vehicles. However, for the reasons I have given on previous occasions, as long as the Soviet Union and other militarily significant States possess substantial armed forces and conventional armaments the United States could not give up its nuclear deterrent completely without producing the kind of imbalance in the military mix which none of us wishes to see.

I have said that our proposals for verification of these nuclear measures are dependent in part on necessary research and study by nuclear experts. We hope to be able to rely upon inspection of all transfers of fissionable materials, all destruction of non-nuclear components, and all declared production and refabrication plants, together with a method, such as progressive zonal inspections, for retained stockpiles and undeclared production.

The Soviet draft treaty calls for verification of "the implementation of the measures to eliminate nuclear weapons"; for verification of the implementation of "measures for the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons"; and for inspection of "all enterprises which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy". (ENDC/2, art 22, pp. 14, 15)

This language from the Soviet draft, I submit, provides no verification for hidden nuclear weapons or hidden production at undeclared plants. Indeed our Soviet colleague, in his intervention at our fortieth meeting, made it clear that no such verification was intended. He said:

"Its [the international disarmament organization] inspectors are to verify the destruction of nuclear weapons and their depots and storage places;...."

(ENDC/PV.40, p. 27);

(Mr. Dean, United States)

he referred only to the destruction of nuclear weapons, depots and premises for their storage, the so-called "destruction by bonfire" -

"the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons and the conversion to peaceful uses of the nuclear fuel contained in nuclear ammunitions". (ibid)

Again, this is like the bonfire - inspection of each declared "discontinuance" and "conversion" but not of clandestine or hidden activities.

Mr. Zorin continued:

"These inspectors will have the right to inspect all enterprises which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy, on the basis of documents made available to the international disarmament organisation by the States parties to the treaty".

(ibid)

I quote that language again: the inspectors would have the right to inspect on the basis of documents submitted by the States parties to the treaty. They would have no right of inspection, according to the language of our Soviet colleagues, apart from this documentation. This last language appears to me to cast considerable doubt on the meaning of the provisions of the Soviet draft treaty. Is it really intended that the inspection of declared plants is to be only on the basis of documents supplied by the host country? If so, what does this mean? Suppose, for example, that the documents do not indicate any need for inspection, but suppose further that the international disarmament organization has other information indicating that there is such a need. Can the international disarmament organization then conduct an on-site inspection? I would like to ask our Soviet colleague for further enlightenment on this point.

Finally, as our Soviet colleague has pointed out to us a number of times, the Soviet draft calls in stage II for the enactment of national legislation "on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and on amenability under the criminal law for any attempt at its re-establishment by individuals or organizations." (ENDC/2, art 22 (3), p. 15)

Our Soviet colleague has taken us to task because the United States draft treaty outline, he says, has no comparable language. First, I would like to point out to Mr. Zorin that in the United States stage I, and not in stage II, we propose that the parties undertake "to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type - including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of

(Mr. Dean, United States)

warfare - contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter". (ENDC/30, section H, para 1, p. 17). In form this is different from the Soviet prohibition on nuclear weapons but it is, I submit, the same in substance.

Secondly, the United States draft also has a proposal in stage II for the enactment of national legislation in support of obligations of parties to the treaty. I refer to section G, paragraph 5 of stage II which states:

"Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would, in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate penalties for non-compliance." (ibid., p. 26)

The United States draft treaty thus contains a prohibition on nuclear warfare, phrased similarly to the more general prohibition in the United Nations Charter. It also contains a provision calling for enactment of national legislation in support of this and other prohibitions in the treaty. So I do not think that the United States and the Soviet Union are very far apart on this point.

Today I have sought, as I said earlier, to give only the highlights of the United States outline and to indicate why the United States believes its draft outline offers a sounder approach to our goal of general and complete disarmament than does the Soviet stage II plan. As I also said earlier, I plan to make several more statements with respect to stage I and to answer the questions of Mr. Hassan of the United Arab Republic. But I thought that before I finished my further statements with respect to stage I it might be better if I gave this morning a broader perspective of the general outlines of our stage II. I plan in future meetings to revert to a discussion of the question of bases, both foreign and domestic, and the timing of their elimination; armaments; verification; the setting up of the United Nations peace force and the peace observation corps; and military expenditures.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I should like to express our satisfaction at the fact that with today's statement by the United States representative we have, so to speak, all been brought up to date with the trend of our discussion. It is hardly a week ago that the Committee began a general review of the discussion of the first part of stage I and embarked on the consideration of stage II of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. This method, which consists in reviewing successively the stages of the two drafts submitted respectively by the Soviet Union and the United States will give us a better idea of the prospects of agreement and the possible variants of the disarmament measures in the different stages concerned.

The essential conditions which must be satisfied by a programme of general and complete disarmament and the disarmament process itself have been discussed at length on the basis of the agreed principles for complete and general disarmament formulated in the Joint Statement. Two essential conditions have been particularly stressed by the great majority of those taking part in the discussion of stage I and the two drafts.

In the first place, the process of general and complete disarmament must be carried out as quickly as possible in order to avoid any imbalance, as well as difficulties connected with the problem of control that might arise during that process. Secondly, the first stages of general and complete disarmament should include substantial disarmament measures so that mankind may be freed from the appalling menace of a nuclear war which has been hanging over the world since the beginning of the nuclear age.

These two conditions have been particularly well-elucidated in the statements of several representatives of the non-aligned countries who in a sincere desire for progress and with characteristic tact are making their contribution to the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

In his statement of 11 April 1962, the Indian representative speaking on the need for a rapid realization of general and complete disarmament said:

"Seriously, however, the point is that the quicker the process of disarmament, the more effective general control and, secondly, the less the chance that during the progress of disarmament it would be possible for any country to begin building up afresh by improving its methods, by improving its weaponry; it stops such a country from improving its weaponry so as to counterbalance the effect of the cuts which it makes in any given period. This again is an important consideration." (ENDC/PV.18, p. 39)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

It is a condition of prime importance that disarmament should be rapid in order to avoid the difficulties, the doubts and the mistrust arising from piecemeal disarmament, as envisaged by the measures provided for in the United States draft. Thus, as the Indian representative eloquently said on the same occasion, it would be difficult to put the clock back, very difficult to put the disarmament process into reverse.

Moreover, the necessity of including substantial measures in stage I of disarmament was stressed in the thoughtful and well-considered statement of the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, who on 21 May said:

" It would be my delegation's hope that between them these stages [stage I and stage II] could contain all the major elements of disarmament such as the elimination of all the nuclear weapons and their carriers, reduction of armed forces and armaments and liquidation of all potentially offensive military bases and that stage III would be devoted mainly to providing for the smooth transition of States to a disarmed world." (ENDC/PV.40, p. 35)

These essential conditions for achieving as rapidly as possible general and complete disarmament and the ridding the world of the nightmare and the real danger of nuclear war are admirably fulfilled in the Soviet draft treaty and in particular, in the first two stages. Stage I of the draft submitted by the Soviet Union, while ensuring the complete elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles under effective international control and a substantial reduction of armaments of the conventional type, neutralizes, immobilizes nuclear weapons and thereby practically eliminates the danger of surprise attack and nuclear war.

At the same time, stage I is a logical introduction to stage II of general and complete disarmament. The effective neutralization of nuclear weapons carried out in stage I would be followed in stage II by their complete destruction. The elimination of the other weapons of mass destruction -- chemical, biological and radiological -- would also be complete. Armed forces and their conventional armaments would be reduced for all States to a minimum which would preclude even the possibility of taking up the idea of undertaking an aggression. This possibility would moreover be practically excluded by an effective international control covering the whole of the measures for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their vehicles and also the measures which would have lead to the destruction of a large part of conventional armaments and the disbanding of considerable armed forces.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

At the same time, the Soviet draft provides in stage I for the cessation of production of nuclear weapon vehicles and in stage II for the total cessation of production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the total destruction or reconversion for peaceful purposes of the plants and laboratories producing nuclear weapons and components.

In these conditions, what is the value of the assertions of certain Western delegations that the Soviet draft does not contain in stage I any provisions regarding nuclear disarmament? Such statements have been repeatedly made, particularly by the United States delegation which, since the beginning of our discussions, has not ceased to repeat that the Soviet Union does not provide in stage I for any measures for nuclear disarmament. On 25 May, the United States representative said once again that:

"... while proposing no reduction of nuclear weapons or fissionable material in the first stage, the Soviet draft proposes the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons in the second stage." (ENDC/PV.42, p. 9)

Today the United States representative asserted or, rather, tried to make out that in the first stage the Soviet draft contains no provision for solving the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is true that in his statement of 25 May, the United States representative tried to show that the Soviet draft would by the total elimination of these dangerous weapons create an imbalance during the process of general and complete disarmament. It is none the less true that the assertion that the Soviet draft contains no measures for nuclear disarmament in stage I is constantly made by the Western delegations in order to imply that in reality the Soviet draft treaty does not contemplate liquidation of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the disarmament process. The statement that we have heard again today was aimed at insinuating that the Soviet Union does not contemplate dealing in stage I in any serious way with the liquidation of nuclear weapons.

We should like to stress that, in regard to the question of radical disarmament measures and in particular nuclear disarmament, the Soviet draft provides in stages I and II, for the liquidation of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons and of nuclear weapons themselves. We should like to point out in particular that the time required for the execution of the two successive stages of general and complete disarmament under the Soviet Union draft treaty is in fact the same as that required for implementation of stage I only under the United States draft. And, as has been quite plainly shown by the discussion in the Committee, stage I of the United States

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

draft does not entail any reduction in the destructive power of the armaments of States. The time factor is particularly important when comparing the different stages of the two drafts, that of the Soviet Union and that of the United States. It is therefore worthwhile stressing again that the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union provides -- in accordance with the desire expressed by the great majority of delegations -- at the end of stage I of disarmament for the elimination of the danger of surprise attack and at the end of stage II for the elimination of any danger of nuclear war. There will thus be no difficulty in the transition to stage III, that is to say to a completely disarmed world.

Whereas the Soviet draft, complying with the wishes of the peoples of the whole world, contributes at the end of stage II to the establishment of a world in which war would be hardly conceivable, the draft submitted by the United States provides only for a problematical reduction -- I repeat problematical -- of nuclear weapons and the vehicles for their delivery. Consequently, not only would it bring no alleviation of world fear, but it would create, if it were put into effect, new difficulties in the safeguarding of peace between States. Indeed, with a reduction, at the end of stage II, of nuclear weapon vehicles to 35 per cent of the level at the time of the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and with a completely indeterminate situation as regards the future of nuclear weapons, the world would not be able to breathe any more freely as regards the risk of a nuclear attack, which in those conditions would be always possible, and perhaps even more probable than at the present time. It must not be forgotten that during this period the general staff of a potential aggressor would be able to accumulate information as a result of the control measures provided for in the same draft treaty, and thereby supplement the information which it already possessed and which had been obtained by other means. This would enable it to launch an attack against vital objectives on the territory of a possible adversary.

Moreover, it is not at all certain that under the provisions of the United States draft it will be possible to reduce existing armaments to a lower level simply because the percentage reductions -- I repeat percentage reductions -- proposed by the United States are hardly calculated to encourage States, at the present time and during the whole period of the ensuing negotiations, to put a stop to the arms race. On the contrary, they encourage the continuance and even the speeding-up of the arms race in order to be able, when the treaty has been signed, to dispose of a quantity of

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

armaments which, as a result of a fixed percentage reduction, would give it considerable advantages over a possible opponent.

That the possibility of a frantic arms race exists, and even constitutes a real danger when proposals are put forward for a percentage reduction, is shown by the fact that at the very moment when we are undertaking negotiations on the treaty for general and complete disarmament, the Western Powers are conducting nuclear tests in order to improve their arms of this type and to increase their destructive capacity. In these conditions we might very well find ourselves in a situation, where, at the end of stage II of disarmament, the absolute volume of the most dangerous weapons, or at least their destructive power, would be greater than it is at the present level. That is, briefly, the prospect which the United States draft offers us.

However, we do not wish, at this initial stage of the discussion on stage II, to deal further in detail with the measures contained in stage II of the United States plan, because in view of the concept itself of the United States draft and its concrete provisions, it is hard to imagine how there could be any transition to the implementation of stage II.

In our statement of 11 May (ENDC/PV.35) we pointed out that the United States plan was conceived and drafted in such a way as to frustrate the realization of general and complete disarmament. Even a cursory study of the plans submitted by the United States shows that it is full of obstacles on the path to general and complete disarmament.

First of all, in stage I there is a provision that arrangements should be made to examine unresolved questions relating to means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction of chemical and biological weapons. There is a similar clause in regard to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Paragraph 6 of section C of the United States draft, dealing with nuclear weapons, states that "The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles," and that "In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapons stockpiles."

(ENDC/30, p. 10)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

It will be recalled that at an informal meeting of the Committee we asked the United States representative whether the reduction of nuclear weapons provided for in stage II of the United States draft was conditional on such studies or not. The only reply that we were given was once again a reference to the relevant part of the United States draft, and we were told that the text was perfectly clear. Unless I am mistaken the United States representative wished to persuade us that the United States draft provided for nuclear disarmament measures in stage I, whereas the Soviet plan left such questions until stage II. He also implied that the United States plan provided in stage II for firm commitments in regard to the reduction of nuclear weapons. That was why, at that particular time, we asked the question that I mentioned. The reply which we were given left us all completely puzzled. However, the United States intentions become much clearer, if one examines the provisions concerning the transition from stage I to stage II, and from stage II to stage III, in connexion, of course, with the corresponding parts of stage III dealing with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In fact, in the provisions for transition from one stage to the following stage, there is the stipulation - and this in the particular case of stage II - that "All undertakings to be carried out in stage II had been carried out" (ENDC/30, Section H, para 1.a., p. 26).

Further, in paragraph 1.e. of section C, which follows the measures under subparagraphs a., b., c. and d. concerning the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, it is stated that these measures, which relate to nuclear disarmament, "would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty" (ibid., p. 24)

Thus the United States draft treaty includes no preliminary obligation to reduce nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons in stage II. The only stipulation is that, in the light of studies to be undertaken during stage I on the possibility of eliminating these weapons, an annex to the treaty will be prepared before stage II, in which agreed percentages - the famous percentages! - will be determined of the quantities and types of fissionable materials which will have been declared as earmarked for nuclear weapons.

If there were the slightest doubt that under the United States draft there would be no previously agreed reduction and that any reduction would be subject to prior conditions, the statement of the United States representative of 25 May would completely dispel it. Speaking of the study of the possibility of elimination of

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

nuclear weapons, the study which would be undertaken in stage I of the United States draft, Mr. Dean said:

"If this study is successful, we would be happy to agree to further effective means for dealing with nuclear stockpiles." (ENDC/PV.42, p. 14) (It is necessary to stress here that the so-called "effective means" in stage I of the United States draft consist simply of the transfer of fifty tons of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes. And there might be endless discussion whether that is a genuine disarmament measure or, on the contrary, one which entirely sidesteps disarmament.) Mr. Dean added:

"However, if that examination cannot be conducted until stage I starts, we shall certainly delay our progress in accomplishing the goal we all seek - the elimination of all nuclear weapon stockpiles now in the hands of four nations." (ibid, p.14)-15)

I stress "now in the hands of four nations".

In passing, I should like to make the modest comment that what is in question is not the nuclear weapons "now" in the hands of the nuclear Powers, but those which they will have at their disposal when the treaty is signed, that is to say, after an arms race intensified by the United States proposals for percentage reductions.

In order to show quite plainly what he meant, Mr. Dean repeated:

"Our draft proposes a reduction of such stockpiles to minimum levels in stage II and their complete elimination in stage III, in the light of the steps taken earlier." (ibid, p. 15)

From all this, it is manifest that not only will there be no firm commitment in the United States draft regarding the reduction of nuclear weapons in stage II, but that, on the contrary, a new treaty - no matter whether it is called an "arrangement" or an "annex" - would have to be negotiated and signed during the implementation of the treaty. And this in the most favourable hypothesis that the studies provided for stage I are successful. But what if they are not, and if new stratagems are found to delay agreement on the destruction of nuclear weapons?

It is therefore obvious that the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons will not be carried out under the United States draft unless the experts entrusted with these studies conclude that it is possible in the conditions prevailing at the time when it should take place. Then and then only the question will be taken up by the negotiators of the treaty. Well, we all know how some experts are likely to give their decisions when they are under the strong influence of certain circles.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

A second point which makes problematical -- one may even say that the possibility is practically non-existent -- the transition from stage I to stage II under the United States plan is the fact that it is laid down in the provisions concerning transition that the transition from stage I to stage II would take place when "All militarily significant states had become Parties to the Treaty". (ENDC/30, section I, para. 1.C, p. 19)

It will be recalled that in our statement of 11 May (ENDC/PV.35, p.22) we put the following question to the United States delegation: under the United States draft does one contemplate the conclusion of the treaty without the participation, for instance, of France or of Western Germany? Or is it intended to keep other States which are militarily significant outside the treaty on general and complete disarmament? We have received no reply to our question and neither have you. However, it is easy to see that certain militarily significant States, such as the Federal Republic of Germany and others, may not wish to accede to the treaty in stage I for reasons which from the standpoint of certain imperialist circles are understandable. It is well-known, as a matter of fact, that at this very moment the imperialist military circles of Western Germany are making enormous efforts to obtain the necessary data for the production of nuclear weapons and vehicles for their delivery. In their search for such a possibility the imperialist circles in Western Germany are already being helped by their NATO allies. Between now and the time I have in mind, namely the moment of transition from the stage I to stage II, Western Germany might well succeed in acquiring certain facilities and even the secret of the production of nuclear weapons. However it would not perhaps have built up the necessary stockpiles in order to be properly associated in the disarmament process. In these conditions it is quite likely that with the provisions of the United States draft and taking into account its policy and that of its allies, there might be one or more militarily significant States which would not be prepared to accede readily to the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

A third point on which I do not wish to insist very much because a lengthy discussion on it has already been going on for some time in our Committee, is that under the United States draft any permanent member of the control council of the international disarmament organization may at any moment block the disarmament process by simply expressing the opinion that it is not satisfied with the progress and the implementation of the process, and whereas in the control council that veto can only

(Mr. Tarebanov, Bulgaria)

delay the disarmament process, in the Security Council such a veto can block it altogether. This double veto provided for in the United States draft is another means for stopping the disarmament process and putting it into reverse.

In these conditions, with proposals such as those of the United States draft, it may be rightly asked whether it will be ever possible to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I cannot help recalling a story told to us by Mr. Dean - moreover, quite inappropriately - at that time. We wonder whether the United States, which has submitted a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under the pressure of world public opinion has not been behaving like the mother in the story which Mr. Dean told us and which I recall:

"Mother dear, may I go for a swim?

Yes, my darling daughter.

Hang your clothes on a hickory limb,

But don't go near the water."

I wonder indeed whether the United States plan, after the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, is not that of giving negative instructions to the United States delegation on these lines: "You may propose general and complete disarmament, because there is no other way of getting out of it; you may set forth your arguments in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, but do not get too close to a real treaty on general and complete disarmament."

To sum up, it is obvious that if we are determined to make progress in the task assigned to us of reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament, we have to take into consideration the draft which offers sure guarantees of leading to the implementation of such an agreement. Such guarantees can be found in the provisions laid down for stages I and II of the Soviet draft. It is the only draft which provides assurance that we shall achieve general and complete disarmament. That is why we must study every possibility of adopting the provisions included in that draft.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): During recent plenary meetings the representative of the Soviet Union has been explaining the measures in the second stage of the Soviet treaty and has commented on the parallel United States measures; today Mr. Dean has undertaken a similar process with regard to the measures in the second stage of the United States outline draft treaty, commenting on how those compare with the provisions in the Soviet draft treaty.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation agrees with the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union some days ago that there are deep inner links between the various stages of disarmament as set forth in the two drafts, and that we ought to examine these in order to explore the possibilities of removing our differences. Nevertheless, we feel that, though this comparison is necessary and should be undertaken without undue delay, the Committee would desire that enough time should be taken and the explanations of all the measures in each stage should be full enough to enable us to understand them thoroughly and to discuss them intelligently. We are therefore glad to note Mr. Dean's statement this morning that he intends to continue with his complete exposition of the measures in the first stage of the United States outline draft treaty.

The Canadian delegation is reluctant to keep harping on the theme of the control of the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, but this matter is so important that we feel it would not be desirable to end the discussion of stage I measures without a further statement of our views, especially in the light of the remarks which were made by Mr. Zorin (ENDC/PV.41, pp.34-35) when he replied to the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, during our meeting on 24 May.

On 25 May, Mr. Dean devoted a large part of his closely reasoned statement to demonstrating the difficulties which are inseparable from the Soviet Union proposal to abolish all nuclear weapon vehicles in stage I (ENDC/PV.42, pp.8-21). I shall try not to be repetitive, but I do wish to emphasize some of Mr. Dean's arguments, perhaps in a more generalized form.

The position of the Canadian delegation, as has been stated before, is that every measure proposed should be shown to be capable of effective international control, and that unless it can be so shown the measure has no place in the eventual disarmament plan, because of the Agreed Principle which we have quoted several times. We should like to make it clear also that we take the adjective "effective" in the phrase "effective international control" not to mean 100 per cent certainty when the verification is related to disarmament measures which conform to the other vital principle of balance, but to mean giving sufficient assurance that obligations are being executed to enable States in the conditions of the world today to accept the residual risk which, as many delegations have pointed out, must be taken if general and complete disarmament is to be achieved.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

On 16 May, the representative of the Soviet Union took me to task because I had said that I believed that the measures which had been proposed for the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in the United States outline draft treaty were more practical than those in the Soviet plan. (ENDC/PV.38, p.44) Mr. Zorin said that he did not think I had proved that point. I am sorry if my arguments have not convinced him, but I should like to try again to explain what I mean. I said "practical", but perhaps a better word would have been "feasible". I do not know how the translation of these two adjectives comes out in Russian, but I intend "practical" to mean in contrast to the theoretical. In examining a measure of disarmament, however attractive at first glance, we must be able to see that it is possible to put it into practice, to put it into effect. To eliminate the possibility of nuclear war in only a few months would indeed be desirable, if it were possible. But the question we really must answer is: Is it feasible? Can this be done? And can it be done in accordance with the agreed principle of control?

The arguments which have been advanced by other members of the Western delegations and myself, and most recently by Mr. Dean in the statement he made last Friday, have been that if one is proposing that 100 per cent of nuclear weapon vehicles shall be eliminated in the first stage, then one must show how it can be proved rigorously that this 100 per cent elimination has taken place. I must argue again that Mr. Zorin has not shown us how such proof can be established.

On the other hand, if nuclear weapon vehicles were eliminated in steps and stages the requirements for control would become progressively less rigorous, for reasons which have been explained by other Western delegations several times and which amount to the proposition that, as confidence in the good intentions of all concerned is built up by reasonable proof of the execution of early obligations, then belief in the final elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles and other armaments is more easily established.

To revert to the feasibility of disarmament measures, "feasible" must be understood in the light of the present state of the world -- the state of distrust and suspicion to which many delegations here have referred. I might say in passing that if anyone has any doubts about the distrust and suspicion which exist, I would think that the statement by the representative of Bulgaria which we have just heard shows that there is a good deal of suspicion as to the motives and intentions of some of the States that are playing an important part in this Conference. How does

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

this non-confidence factor affect the carrying out of the proposal for 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage?

On 18 May, Mr. Zorin said:

"Let us imagine for a moment whether a State which, owing to a number of circumstances is compelled to rely on rockets as its basic means of defence, can allow control over and inspection of its rocket installations, rockets and boosters, if the threat of a nuclear attack by the other side is not removed? I shall not give the answer in detail. It is obvious. Of course it cannot." (ENDC/PV.39, p.36)

Mr. Zorin is saying that unless all the vehicles are destroyed the Soviet Union would not find itself able to disclose the positions of its missile systems or, in other words, to open its territory for inspection so as to prove that no means of delivery of the nuclear weapon existed other than those which had been disclosed to the international disarmament organization. That is the effect of the lack of confidence of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Western countries which have nuclear weapon vehicles are not going to destroy all of them until it is proven by verification measures that the other side has in fact destroyed all of its nuclear weapon vehicles. That is the result of the lack of confidence on the other side. The representative of Burma pointed out this impasse in his very interesting statement on 21 May. (ENDC/PV.40, pp. 31-36)

Now these operations of collection, verification of nil remainder and destruction of nuclear weapon vehicles have to be related to each other in time, within the first stage, as I have explained on a previous occasion, and we have definitely not been shown the order in which these operations are going to be carried out. We have not been shown how we are to reconcile, on the one hand, the fear of the Soviet Union that it may be attacked if it disclosed its dispositions and on the other, the fear of the West that if it destroys all its weapon vehicles the Soviet Union may not in fact have destroyed all of its. And Mr. Zorin has not shown how this dilemma can be overcome under his proposals, which call for all nuclear weapon vehicles to be eliminated in stage I.

On 18 May, the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.39) and the representative of Bulgaria, (*ibid*) said, in effect, that we have not so far been able to agree on what the control over this most important measure ought to be. Well, let us pass that by and agree on how the nuclear weapon vehicles should be

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

eliminated, and then we will agree on the control. The Canadian delegation would hope that these statements, taken with other remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union which I shall later cite, are an intimation that the Soviet delegation has it in mind to seek a way of solving the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles which does not run into the contradictions to which I have just referred.

On 27 May, Mr. Dean dealt with the necessity of gradualness in the programme of disarmament in considerable detail (ENDC/PV.42, pp. 8 - 21). General and complete disarmament is unprecedented in relations between the nations; it is, as many delegations have said, a new adventure for humanity. To speak in very general terms, in any new and unprecedented enterprise it is the part of wisdom to go forward step by step, to try to move from the known through the unknown by prudent stages. I think that we could learn something about the way we should go about general and complete disarmament from the way in which the Soviet Union has developed its exploration of space. It did not immediately fire off a rocket with several men in it to land on the moon; instead, it started with Sputnik I, which contained only instruments; then it orbited animals and eventually, when enough experience had been accumulated, it sent Major Gagarin round the world. The United States, which has very recently repeated previous successes in "putting a girdle round the earth", went at the colossal problems involved in much the same way.

In other words, to accomplish something entirely unprecedented, we move by degrees. So, to the Canadian delegation's way of thinking, in developing international relations in the unexampled mode of general and complete disarmament, we should proceed stage by stage and step by step, and especially in the vital sector of the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles.

In closing I will quote from the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union on 18 May. After having given a general review of the positions of the two sides on measures in the first stage, as he saw them, he said:

"It is our duty to find a solution to the differences which have arisen. Can we find a way out of the situation if we limit our discussion to the first stage only and we delay the discussion of the two remaining stages of disarmament? Of course not. In this connexion, I should like to remind you of the considerations concerning the possibility of transferring measures from one stage to another, which have been expressed by several delegations. What follows from this? It follows that between the

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

various stages there are deep inner links and therefore that in order to elucidate the possibilities of overcoming the differences which have arisen we must take a look at the second and third stages of disarmament."

(ENDC/PV.39, p. 38)

He went on:

".... it would be useful to ask the co-Chairmen ... to try, with due regard to the exchange of views which has taken place in the Committee, to bring closer the positions on the questions relating to the first stage of disarmament. The Soviet delegation is prepared to enter into such negotiations with the United States delegation." (ibid)

The Canadian delegation considers that this statement by Mr. Zorin is encouraging, and we hope that in due course the co-Chairmen will have discussions to bring the positions in the two plans, and not only in the first stage, closer together. We hope that they will bear in mind various suggestions by members of this Committee, and notably those made by representatives of non-aligned States; and we hope that they will succeed, in consultation with their governments, in reducing differences and eventually eliminating them.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its forty-third plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Naszkowski, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Poland.

"The representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, Bulgaria and Canada made statements.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 29 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.